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CAMBODIA V. THAILAND: A CASE 
STUDY ON THE USE OF PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES TO PROTECT HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL BORDER 
DISPUTES 
INTRODUCTION 
he Temple of Preah Vihear (“Temple”) was constructed 
during the reign of the Khmer Empire1 as a dedication to 
Shiva, the Hindu god of destruction.2 Internationally recog-
nized for its architectural complexity, stone ornamentation, 
and religious value as a modern day place of pilgrimage, the 
Temple holds sacred value to local residents and tourists alike.3 
However, due to its location on a highly contested portion of the 
Thai-Cambodian border, the Temple sits vulnerably at the cen-
ter of a longstanding territorial dispute.4 Despite a 1962 ruling 
                                                                                                             
 1. The Khmer Empire ruled over present day Cambodia as well as parts 
of Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam from the 9th – 15th century C.E. Khmer Em-
pire, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPÆDIA, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Khmer_Empire (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2012). 
 2. Temple of Preah Vihear, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND 
CULTURAL ORGANIZATION: WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1224 (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). King 
Yasovarman I founded the Temple in the 9th century C.E., and its construc-
tion was carried out over the next 300 years by successor kings. The remote 
location atop a 525-meter cliff provides exquisite views and has allowed the 
Temple to remain largely intact, despite being a source of conflict and land 
mines during the Cambodian Civil War and the invasion of the Khmer Rouge 
from 1975-1998. The Temple remains a source of national pride for both 
Cambodia and Thailand due to its historical, cultural, and religious signifi-
cance. Id.; Khmer Empire, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Khmer_Empire (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2012). 
 3. Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 2. 
 4. The Temple is located on a plateau in the eastern sector of the 
Dangrek mountain range, which constitutes the border between Thailand 
and Cambodia. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 
I.C.J. 6, 15 (June 15) [hereinafter Cambodia v. Thai., Judgment]. “Questions 
of sovereignty are complicated by the Temple’s location at the top of a 1,640-
foot cliff. It is almost inaccessible from Cambodia, but it is reachable through 
Thailand by a comfortable drive over a paved road.” Seth Mydans, Thai-
Cambodian Temple Standoff Continues, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/world/asia/21cambodia.html#. 
T
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by the International Court of Justice (“Court”) that the Temple 
“is situated in territory under the sovereignty of Cambodia” 
and that Thailand is obligated to withdraw any military forces 
stationed “at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian terri-
tory,” questions of territorial sovereignty remain unresolved 
and armed conflicts surrounding the Temple have resulted in 
fatalities, injuries, and evacuations of local civilians.5 
The most recent outbreak of armed violence occurred after 
Cambodia nominated the Temple as a UNESCO6 World Herit-
age site.7 Thailand responded to the nomination in two ways, 
first by deploying troops to occupy the area around the Temple 
and then by publicly asserting ownership over 4.6 square kilo-
meters of land adjacent to the Temple.8 Although Thailand 
concedes that the Temple is situated in Cambodian territory, 
Thailand asserts that the 1962 judgment did not effectively de-
lineate the entire frontier line9 and that its obligation to with-
draw military forces from the Temple was not a permanent or-
der and therefore, as it applied only to the 1962 altercation, is 
no longer in effect.10 On April 28, 2011, Cambodia brought the 
case before the Court in hopes of bringing peace to the conflict-
                                                                                                             
 5. Cambodia v. Thai., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 53; Mydans, supra note 
4. 
 6. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that encourages 
sustainable development and the promotion of peace. UNESCO seeks to “en-
courage identification, protection and preservation of cultural and natural 
heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding value to humani-
ty.” This is embodied in the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, an international treaty adopted by 
UNESCO in 1972. About World Heritage, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTER 
(Aug. 10, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/. 
 7. Interpretation of Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Applica-
tion Instituting Proceedings, ¶¶ 12–14 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/151/16470.pdf [hereinafter Cambodia v. Thai, Application 
Instituting Proceedings]. 
 8. Id. ¶ 14. 
 9. “A ‘boundary’ denotes a line whereas a ‘frontier’ is more properly a re-
gion or zone having width as well as length and, therefore, merely indicates, 
without fixing the exact limit, where one State ends and another begins.” A. 
O CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 11 (1967). 
 10. Interpretation of Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Provi-
sional Measures Order, ¶¶ 29–30 (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/151/16564.pdf [hereinafter Cambodia v. Thai, Provisional 
Measures Order]. 
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ed region and of finally resolving the longstanding border dis-
pute.11 
Though consent by both parties is generally required to in-
voke the Court’s jurisdiction, Article 60 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (“Statute”) authorizes parties to 
unilaterally seek clarification of prior judgments.12 Accordingly, 
despite Thailand’s jurisdictional objections,13 Cambodia re-
quested an interpretation of the 1962 Judgment to clarify 
whether “Thailand’s obligation to withdraw its military forces 
goes beyond a withdrawal from only the precincts of the Tem-
ple itself and extends to the area of the Temple in general” and 
whether the obligation is “general and continuing.”14 Due to the 
outbreak of armed conflict near the Temple, Cambodia also re-
quested the immediate withdrawal of all Thai troops from the 
area as a provisional measure.15 Under Article 41 of the Stat-
ute, the Court may issue provisional measures to preserve the 
disputed rights and prevent incidents likely to aggravate or ex-
tend the conflict while the judgment is pending.16 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. at 2, 7–8; see also Thai-Cambodia Clashes ‘Damage Preah Vihear 
Temple’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2011), http:www.bbc.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-
12377626. 
 12. Statute of the International Court of Justice [hereinafter Statute of the 
I.C.J.] art. 60, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
 13. In the present case, Thailand argued that there was no dispute be-
tween the parties under Article 60, and therefore the Court had no basis for 
jurisdiction. Cambodia v. Thai, Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 31. Thailand 
also objected to the Court’s jurisdiction in 1959 on grounds that it had not 
accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36. Thailand ar-
gued that the Siamese declaration of September 20, 1929, accepting compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court, lapsed with the dissolution of the PCIJ and 
could not be renewed by the 1950 declaration. However, the Court rejected 
Thailand’s arguments on grounds that the 1950 declaration revealed a clear 
intention to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the present court, since 
there was no other Court to which it could have related. See generally Temple 
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Preliminary Objections Judgment, 1961 
I.C.J. 17 (May 26) [hereinafter Cambodia v. Thai., Preliminary Objections 
Judgment]. 
 14. Cambodia v. Thai., Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶¶ 36–37. 
 15. Interpretation of Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thai.), Re-
quest for Provisional Measures, ¶ 9 (Apr. 28, 2011), available at www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/151/16472.pdf [herinafter Cambodia v. Thai., Request for 
Provisional Measures]. 
 16. Statute of the I.C.J. art. 41, para.1, supra note 12. The Court has held 
that “[t]he context in which Article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is to 
prevent the Court from being hampered in the exercise of its functions be-
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On July 18, 2011, the Court issued an order (“July 18 Order”) 
granting Cambodia’s request for provisional measures and di-
recting both countries, inter alia, to (1) withdraw all military 
personnel from a judicially devised provisional demilitarized 
zone (“PDZ”) surrounding the Temple and (2) to refrain from 
any armed activity directed at the zone.17 Neither party com-
plied with the order of troop withdrawal following the execu-
tion of the July 18 Order and troops remained stationed at the 
Temple despite the binding judgment.18 In creating the PDZ—
to prevent further harm to persons and property in the area 
pending its judgment on the merits—the Court broke with its 
precedent of confining its provisional measures to only those 
rights directly at issue in the primary dispute, here the right to 
territorial sovereignty.19 
By extending protection to civilians in the area of the Temple, 
the Court reinforced its recent liberalization of the power to 
issue provisional measures to protect human rights in pending 
border disputes.20 Although this is a welcome departure from 
longstanding jurisprudence, the July 18 Order also strayed 
from precedent in other, alarming ways. First, the PDZ in-
cludes the Temple, which the Court has previously ruled be-
longs to Cambodia,21 as well as other undisputed territories not 
                                                                                                             
cause the respective rights of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not 
preserved.” LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.) Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, ¶ 102 (June 
27) [hereinafter Ger. v. U.S., Judgment]. 
 17. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 69(B)(1). The Court 
provided coordinates of the PDZ in paragraph 62 of the Order as well as a 
sketch-map illustrating the demilitarized zone in relation to the two States. 
Id. at 16-17. 
 18. PM Wants Parliament to Debate Troop Move, BANGKOK POST (Aug. 18, 
2012), available at http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/307800/pm-
wants-parliament-to-debate-troop-move. 
 19. See Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Nor. v. 
Den.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 48, at 285 (Aug. 3) [hereinafter Nor. v. 
Den.]. 
 20. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa 
Rica v. Nicar.), Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 85 (Mar. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/150/16324.pdf [hereinafter Costa Rica v. 
Nicar., Provisional Measures Order]; Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Provisional Measures Order, 
1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 48 (Mar. 15); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Provision-
al Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 11 (Jan. 10). 
 21. Cambodia v. Thai., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15). 
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brought before the Court in the main proceeding.22 Second, the 
measure greatly diverges from prior provisional measures in-
volving territorial disputes without providing legitimate justifi-
cation for eschewing precedent.23 
Despite the Court’s laudable intentions to protect the Temple 
and civilian population, its creation of the PDZ exceeds the 
Court’s jurisdictional authority and violates principles of terri-
torial sovereignty that are inherent in international law. This 
Note will explore the Court’s expanding power to issue provi-
sional measures and the question of whether the short-term 
benefits of preventing the risk of irreparable harm outweigh 
the long term costs of deterring states’ willingness to consent to 
the Court’s jurisdiction.24 Part I of this Note will discuss the 
powers of the International Court of Justice generally and its 
evolving jurisprudence to issue provisional measures for the 
protection of human rights. Part II will describe the origins of 
the Temple dispute and the contentious provisional measure 
issued by the Court in the July 18 Order. Part III will discuss 
the importance of maintaining judicial constraints and will 
suggest alternative measures available to protect parties’ 
rights in the future while staying within the bounds of the 
Court’s jurisdiction and respecting notions of territorial sover-
eignty. 
                                                                                                             
 22. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 69(B)(1); Cambodia 
v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 1 (July 18, 2011) (dissenting opinion 
of Judge Xue), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16574.pdf; 
Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 7 (dissenting opinion of 
President Owada), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/151/16566.pdf; Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures 
Order, ¶ 2 (dissenting opinion of Judge Donoghue), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16576.pdf. 
 23. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, pp. 1–2 (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Xue); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 9 
(dissenting opinion of President Owada); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional 
Measures Order, ¶ 4 (dissenting opinion of Judge Donoghue). 
 24. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is consent-based 
and therefore, the Court may only adjudicate disputes when both States have 
recognized its jurisdiction. Contentious Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT 
OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Role of the International Court of Justice 
Judicial settlement of international disputes evolved from the 
use of international mediation and arbitration at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. In 1899 and 1907, two Hague Confer-
ences led to the adoption of the Convention on the Pacific Set-
tlement of International Disputes and the establishment of a 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.25 Shortly thereafter, in 1921, 
the League of Nations established the Permanent Court of In-
ternational Justice (“PCIJ”) to provide a full-time judicial sys-
tem to resolve international disputes.26 However, the outbreak 
of World War II led to the demise of the League of Nations and 
all of the features of the PCIJ were transferred to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in 1946, including the governing Statute 
of the Court, which is annexed to the U.N. Charter and to 
which all members of the United Nations are parties.27 
As successor to the PCIJ, the International Court of Justice 
adopted many of its traditions as well as precedent. The Court 
currently resides in the Peace Palace in The Hague and serves 
as the “principal judicial organ for the United Nations.”28 Ju-
risdiction is limited to civil disputes between states and re-
quires consent ad litem.29 Accordingly, a state may only be 
compelled to settle an international dispute before the Court 
after specifically consenting to jurisdiction for that particular 
dispute.30 Consent may be achieved in three ways: (1) the state 
may accept general compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursu-
ant to Article 36(2) of the Statute;31 (2) the state may enter into 
                                                                                                             
 25. History, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Article 34(1) of the Statute provides that “[o]nly states may be parties 
in cases before the Court.” Statute of the I.C.J., art. 34(1), supra note 12. 
Contentious Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 24. 
Ad litem is a Latin term meaning “for the suit.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 49 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 30. Contentious Jurisdiction, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 
24. 
 31. Article 36(2) of the Statute provides “[t]he States parties to the present 
Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto 
and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the 
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a special agreement with the other disputant to refer the mat-
ter to the Court;32 or (3) the state may be a party to a treaty or 
international agreement which stipulates that any dispute will 
be referred to the Court.33 Cases brought to the Court may be 
argued before all of the Court’s fifteen judges—elected for nine-
year terms by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security 
Council34—however, upon mutual agreement, parties may opt 
for a smaller chamber of three or more judges to adjudicate 
disputes.35 
Under Article 60 of the Statute, a judgment by the Court is 
“final and without appeal.”36 However, Article 60 further pro-
vides that “[i]n the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope 
of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of 
any party.”37 The power to interpret judgments is an important 
                                                                                                             
same obligation.” Sixty-six states have recognized the Court’s jurisdiction as 
compulsory through such declarations. However, these declarations may also 
include certain reservations that will prevent the Court from having jurisdic-
tion under specific circumstances. Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction 
of the Court as Compulsory, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index. Currently, neither Cambodia nor 
Thailand has a declaration in force recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction as 
compulsory. Id. 
 32. Article 36(1) of the Statute provides that, “The jurisdiction of the Court 
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specifically 
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conven-
tions in force.” Statute of the I.C.J., art. 36(1), supra note 12. 
 33. Id. In such cases the matter is generally brought before the Court in a 
written application instituting proceedings. The application is a unilateral 
document which indicates the subject of the dispute, the parties, and the spe-
cific provision which is the basis of jurisdiction. Basis of the Court’s Jurisdic-
tion, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, available at http://www.icj-
jic.org/jurisdiction/index.php. 
 34. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 2, supra note 12; Statute of the I.C.J., art. 13, 
supra note 12; Members of the Court, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2. Under Article 
25 of the Statute, a quorum of nine judges is sufficient to constitute the 
Court. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 25(3), supra note 12. 
 35. Chambers and Committees, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, availa-
ble at http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=4. 
 36. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 60, supra note 12. 
 37. Id. This provision is supplemented by Article 98 of the Rules of the 
Court, which provide, “In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of a 
judgment any party may make a request for its interpretation.” Rules of the 
Court, art. 98(1), I.C.J. ACTS & DOCS 153. In the Interpretation of Land and 
Maritime Boundary, Judge Weeramentary noted, 
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mechanism to ensure international peace and security when 
countries dispute the application of the Court’s judgment, 
which may otherwise result in a lack of compliance and further 
aggravation of the resounding conflict.38 The only requirement 
for jurisdiction in an interpretation proceeding is that there be 
a “dispute as to the meaning or scope” of a prior judgment.39 
Consent by both parties is not required because it is “deemed to 
have already been given by virtue of consent to refer to the 
main dispute to the Court.”40 This aspect may become problem-
atic if the judges construe their interpretive power broadly be-
cause it may deter countries from consenting to the Court’s ju-
risdiction in the first place.41 Moreover, the Court has formally 
recognized that there is no time limit governing the Court’s 
ability to interpret a prior judgment, meaning the Court has 
the power to interpret a judgment even fifty years after its pas-
sage.42 
Due to the unique nature of Article 60 proceedings, the Court 
has devised three important limitations to help preserve the 
rights of the parties and respect the concept of finality in judg-
ments. First, “any request for interpretation must relate to the 
operative part of the judgment and cannot concern the reasons 
                                                                                                             
A judgment, however well crafted, could well embody phraseology 
which, in the context of a given set of circumstances, may require 
some clarification. It is one of those incidents of litigation which the 
judicial experience of ages has shown may arise from time to time, 
and it is precisely for this reason that Article 60 … made such clear 
provision for the right of interpretation. 
Interpretation of Land and Maritime Boundary (Nigeria v. Cameroon), 
Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 31, at 47 (Mar. 25) (dissenting opinion of Vice-
President Weeramantry). 
 38. KAIYAN HOMI KAIKOBAD, INTERPRETATION AND REVISION OF 
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY DECISIONS 326 (2007). 
 39. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 21. 
 40. KAIKOBAD, supra note 38, at 104. 
 41. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 28 (dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Donoghue). 
 42. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order ¶ 37. “Whereas it 
should, at the outset, be made clear that Article 60 of the Statute does not 
impose any time-limit on requests for interpretation.” Id. In contrast, there is 
a time limit for revision of a judgment under Article 61 of the Statute of the 
Court. The application for revision must be made within six months from the 
discovery of a new fact and within ten years from the delivery of the judg-
ment. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 61, supra note 12. 
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for the judgment except in so far as these are inseparable from 
the operative part.”43 Second, “the authority to interpret a 
judgment under Article 60 is not a power to enforce a judgment 
or to oversee its implementation.”44 Finally, the Court’s 
“[i]nterpretation can in no way go beyond the limits of the 
Judgment.”45 In Interpretation of the Preliminary Judgment in 
the Cameroon-Nigeria Land and Maritime Boundary, dissent-
ing Judge Weeramantry noted, “[Parties] may not, for example, 
under the guise of an application under Article 60, attempt to 
seek revision of a judgment or reopen a matter which is already 
res judicata.”46 Given these powerful and intentional limita-
tions, it is important that the Court take them into account 
when ordering a provisional measure pursuant to Article 60.47 
In any case before the Court, the judges have the ability to is-
sue binding provisional measures pending a judgment on the 
merits.48 These interim measures have proven to be an effective 
                                                                                                             
 43. Interpretation of Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon 
and Nigeria (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 31, ¶ 10 (Mar. 25) 
[hereinafter Nigeria v. Cameroon, Judgment]. See also Interpretation of Av-
ena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 2008 
I.C.J. 311, ¶ 47 (July 16). 
 44. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 8 (July 18, 2011) 
(dissenting opinion of Judge Donoghue). The Court has noted that Article 60 
“does not allow [the Court] to consider possible violations of the Judgment 
which it is called upon to interpret.” Interpretation of Land and Maritime 
Boundary (Nigeria v. Cameroon), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 31, at 43 (Mar. 25) 
(dissenting opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry). 
 45. Interpretation Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, I.C.J. Re-
ports 1950, p. 403. 
 46. Nigeria v. Cameroon, Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 31, at 43 (dissenting opin-
ion of Vice-President Weeramantry). Res judicata is a Latin term meaning “a 
thing adjudicated.” The phrase refers to an issue that has been definitively 
settled by judicial decision and is therefore barred from subsequent adjudica-
tion. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (9th ed. 2009). 
 47. The Court has only issued provisional measures under Article 60 juris-
diction in one other case. See Avena & Other Mexican Nat’ls, (Mex. v. U.S.), 
Provisional Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. 311, ¶ 8 (July 16) [hereinafter Mex. 
v. U.S., Provisional Measures Order]. In that case, however, five judges dis-
sented to the order of provisional measures for lack of jurisdiction under Arti-
cle 60. In a joint dissent, Judges Owada, Tomka and Keith argued, “Humani-
tarian considerations which clearly underlie the decision cannot override the 
legal requirements of the Statute of the Court.” Id. at 341. Judge Buer-
genthal further criticized the order for setting a troubling precedent for cases 
involving Article 60 jurisdiction. Id. at 334. 
 48. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 41, supra note 12. 
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preventative tool to ensure that one party to a case will abstain 
from actions that could adversely affect the rights of the other 
while the judicial proceedings are in progress.49 The Court has 
broad discretionary power under Article 41 of the Statute, 
which provides “[t]he Court shall have the power to indicate, if 
it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional 
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective 
rights of either party.”50 Furthermore, Article 75 of the Rules of 
Court states, “[t]he Court may indicate measures that are in 
whole or in part other than those requested, or that ought to be 
taken or complied with by the party which has itself made the 
request.”51 The language of these provisions demonstrates the 
Court’s considerable flexibility in deciding both when a provi-
sional measure is necessary and if so, the manner in which it 
should be ordered.52 
In issuing provisional measures, the Court requires three 
conditions-precedent: (1) the asserted rights must be plausible; 
(2) there must be a link between the alleged rights and the 
provisional measures sought to protect them; and (3) there 
must be an imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the dis-
puted rights.53 These conditions-precedent are particularly im-
                                                                                                             
 49. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Provisional 
Measures Order, 1993 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 46 (Apr. 8) [hereinafter Bosn. & Herz. V. 
Serb. & Montenegro, Provisional Measures Order]; Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures 
Order, 2000 I.C.J. 111, ¶ 43 (July 1) [hereinafter Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 
Provisional Measures Order]; Application of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Provi-
sional Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 145 (Oct. 15) [hereinafter Geor. v. 
Russ., Provisional Measures Order]. 
 50. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 41(1), supra note 12 (emphasis added). 
 51. Rules of the Court, art. 75(2), supra note 37. See also Bosn. & Herz. v. 
Serb. & Montenegro, Provisional Measures Order, 1993 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 46; Dem. 
Rep. Congo v. Uganda, Provisional Measures Order, 2000 I.C.J. 111, ¶ 43; 
Geor. v. Russ., Provisional Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. 353, ¶ 145. 
 52. See Statute of the I.C.J., art. 41(1), supra note 12; Rules of the Court, 
art. 75(2), supra note 37. 
 53. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, pp. 9-12. See also Cos-
ta Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶¶ 53, 64; Avena & Other 
Mexican Nat’ls, (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 58 (Mar. 31) 
[hereinafter Mex. v. U.S., Judgment]. The Court must satisfy these three 
conditions any time it issues an order of provisional measures, even if it is 
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portant due to the nature of Article 41 proceedings. The short 
time frame renders the Court unable to consider the detailed 
evidence or arguments, which are otherwise required for a 
judgment on the merits, and the Court is only vested with pri-
ma facie jurisdiction.54 Accordingly, the conditions-precedent 
must be fully considered and clearly met in order to ensure 
that the Court does not overstep its authority to issue binding 
orders. 
B. The Use of Provisional Measures to Protect Human Rights 
The power to issue interim measures to protect persons from 
imminent danger is arguably one of the most powerful mecha-
nisms by which an international tribunal can address human 
rights abuses.55 That power is expanding even more as courts 
are construing it more liberally in pending border disputes.56 
This growing trend is a departure from the PCIJ’s narrow in-
terpretation of Article 41, which denied provisional measures 
for the protection of human rights where those rights were an-
cillary to the subject matter of the dispute.57 For example, in 
1932, the Norwegian government instituted proceedings in the 
PCIJ against the Danish government to establish the legal va-
                                                                                                             
done proprio motu (by the Court’s own initiative) pursuant to Article 75 of the 
Rules of the Court. 
 54. Rules of the Court, art. 74(1), supra note 37; Costa Rica v. Nicar., Pro-
visional Measures Order, ¶ 2 (Declaration of Judge Greenwood). 
 55. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
LAW OF THE SEA 225 (2005). Rosenne notes, 
The Court’s work in the sphere of provisional measures of protection, 
as it has developed from its cautious beginnings at the start of the 
existence of the Permanent Court in 1927 is probably the most sig-
nificant of the Court’s activities for the settlement of international 
disputes and the maintenance of international peace and security, 
the prime objective of the United Nations of which the Court is a 
principal organ. 
Id. 
 56. Costa Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 85; Cameroon v. 
Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 48; Frontier Dispute 
(Burk. Faso/Mali), Provisional Measures Order, 1986, I.C.J. 3, ¶ 11 (Jan. 10). 
 57. See Nor. v. Den., 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser A/B) No. 48, at 285; Factory at 
Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 12 (Nov. 21); Polish Agrari-
an Reform & German Minority (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser A/B) No. 58 
(July 29). 
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lidity of a 1932 Norwegian Royal Decree claiming sovereignty 
over the Southeastern territory of Greenland.58 The Norwegian 
government requested an order of provisional measures requir-
ing the Danish government “to abstain in the said territory 
from any coercive measure directed against Norwegian nation-
als.”59 However, the PCIJ dismissed Norway’s request on 
grounds that the provisional measure requested would not “af-
fect the existence or value of the sovereign rights claimed by 
Norway over the territory in question,” which, the Court held, 
were the only rights the Court could take into account in issu-
ing a provisional measure.60 
The International Court of Justice has since departed from 
this strict interpretation and has demonstrated a more func-
tional approach in the issuance of provisional measures.61 For-
mer ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins has noted: 
The requirements for the indication of provisional measures 
have evolved over the years. Although these are now well es-
tablished, their scope and application in particular circum-
stances continue to evolve. At the same time, the evolving ju-
risprudence on provisional measures shows a growing ten-
dency to recognize the human realities behind disputes of 
states.62 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. at 278. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 285. 
 61. Prior to 1986, the International Court of Justice followed the PCIJ’s 
jurisprudence in denying provisional measures when requested to protect 
rights not directly at issue in the main proceeding. See Interhandel (Switz. v. 
U.S.) Provisional Measures Order, 1957 I.C.J. 105 (Oct. 24); Aegean Sea Con-
tinental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.) Provisional Measures Order, 1976 I.C.J. 3 
(Sept. 11). However, as Rosenne notes, “During the last twenty or so years, 
requests for provisional measures have gone beyond measures required to 
protect the rights which the requesting party is claiming.” Rosenne, supra 
note 55. See Costa Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 85; Came-
roon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 48; Frontier 
Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Provisional Measures Order, 1986, I.C.J. 3, ¶ 11 
(Jan. 10) [hereinafter Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order]. 
 62. Rosalyn Higgins, Interim Measures for the Protection of Human Rights, 
36 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 91, 108 (1997). Higgins further noted, 
The Burkina Faso/Mali Order and the Cameroon/Nigeria Order, tak-
en together, go beyond the series of cases in which provisional 
measures that protect human life were indicated because the dispute 
in question was exactly about such rights . . . Taken together, they 
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The jurisprudential trend toward more far reaching orders in 
cases involving armed conflict is consistent with principles in 
the U.N. Charter and human rights law.63 However, this liberal 
trend does not grant the Court unfettered discretion to disre-
gard concepts of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
thereby compromising the legitimacy of the Court.64 The Court 
must respect the procedural mechanisms in place and abide by 
accepted principles of international law in order to maintain an 
effective presence in international affairs. 
C. Legal Precedent 
There have been three prior cases in which the Court has or-
dered two parties to disengage their respective military forces 
as a means to avoid violent border conflicts pending a judgment 
on the merits.65 However, in none of the three did the Court go 
so far as to order the withdrawal of military troops from terri-
tories that “indisputably belong to the sovereignty of one or the 
other of the parties.”66 The Court has previously ordered the 
parties to withdraw only from the areas of sovereignty that 
were being contested and which were the subject of the legal 
dispute.67 Furthermore, in prior provisional measures, the 
Court has generally refrained from defining the specific terms 
                                                                                                             
would seem effectively to overrule the determination by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in the Eastern Greenland case 
that no measures will be indicated to afford protection to persons if 
that goes beyond the subject matter of the dispute. 
Id. 
 63. Id.; see also U.N. Charter, preamble. 
 64. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 45; Cambodia v. 
Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 4 (dissenting opinion of Judge Xue); 
Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 10 (dissenting opinion of 
President Owada); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 2 (dis-
senting opinion of Judge Donoghue); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional 
Measures Order, (dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh); Cambodia v. 
Thai., Provisional Measures Order (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Cot). 
 65. Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 27; 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 49; Costa 
Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 86. 
 66. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 7 (dissenting opin-
ion of President Owada). 
 67. Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 22; 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 49; Costa 
Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 86(1). 
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of the troop withdrawal itself and instead left it to the disput-
ing states to decide troop movements or ordered the parties to 
withdraw to positions occupied before the armed conflict.68 
1. Frontier Dispute 
In 1983, the governments of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) 
and the Republic of Mali signed a Special Agreement submit-
ting to the Court a dispute involving the delimitation69 of their 
common frontier line.70 Prior to the Court’s boundary delimita-
tion, armed forces of the Republic of Mali attacked Burkina Fa-
so for violating its territorial sovereignty when it occupied Ma-
lian border villages and conducted a population census in Mali-
an territory.71 Due to the onset of violent armed conflicts along 
the border, both parties requested an immediate order of provi-
sional measures to prevent further conflict.72 The Court recog-
nized that the rights at issue in the primary proceeding were 
“the sovereign rights of the Parties over their respective terri-
tories on either side of the frontier,”73 however, the Court de-
termined that troop withdrawal was necessary to prevent harm 
to persons or property in the disputed area.74 This was the first 
                                                                                                             
 68. Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 27; 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 49. 
 69. “Delimitation means the selection of a boundary site and definition.” 
Whereas “[d]emarcation refers to the construction of boundary markers in the 
landscape.” VICTOR PRESCOTT & GILLIAN D. TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS 
AND BOUNDARIES 12 (2008). 
 70. Burk. Faso/Mali), Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 4. 
 71. On December 25, 1985 Burkinabe troops occupied the villages of Diou-
louna, Kounia, Selba,  and Douna, and raised the flag of Burkina Faso. Id. 
 72. Id. at ¶¶ 6(4), 6(8), 8(3)-(4). Burkina Faso requested, inter alia, that 
each Party “shall withdraw its forces from the area claimed by Mali… [and] 
refrain from any act of territorial administration beyond the line adopted in 
1975 by the Legal Sub-Commission of the OAU Mediation Commission.” 
Whereas Mali requested a provisional measure ordering “each of the Parties 
to refrain from any act or action which might prejudice the rights of the other 
Party… [and] refrain from any act of whatsoever kind which might aggravate 
the dispute.” Mali objected to Burkina Faso’s request on grounds that a troop 
withdrawal would constitute a judgment on the merits and was incompatible 
with the ceasefire agreements. Id. 
 73. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 74. Id. at ¶ 19. The Court noted, 
Whereas, in particular, when two States jointly decide to have re-
course to a chamber of the Court, the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations, with a view to the peaceful settlement of a dispute, 
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case in which the Court extended the “the nature of the rights 
claimed… to cover the eligibility of actual or potential injury to 
human beings for protection through the indication of provi-
sional measures.”75 This landmark decision was the first to ad-
vocate the use of provisional measures as a tool to protect hu-
man rights even when those rights are not directly at issue in 
the proceeding.76 
After determining that provisional measures were necessary 
to protect the civilian population, the Court unanimously or-
dered both parties to withdraw their troops to mutually agreed-
upon positions.77 The parties were given twenty days to reach 
an agreement on the troop withdrawal78 and, if unable to do so, 
were ordered to allow the Court to step in and determine the 
positions through an order.79 The Court refrained from indicat-
                                                                                                             
in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, and Article 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, and incidents subsequently occur 
which not merely are likely to extend or aggravate the dispute but 
comprise a resort of force which is irreconcilable with the principle of 
the peaceful settlement of international disputes, there can be no 
doubt of the Chamber’s power and duty to indicate, if need be, such 
provisional measures as may conduce to the due administration of 
justice. 
Id. 
 75. ROSENNE, supra note 55, at 193. The Court justified the order on 
grounds that the withdrawal of troops was necessary to “eliminat[e] the risk 
of any future action likely to aggravate or extend the dispute.” Burk. Fa-
so/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3 ¶ 27. The non-aggravation 
principle is a judicially devised doctrine that initially developed in the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. case in 1951. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), Provisional 
Measures Order, 1951 I.C.J. 89, 83 (July 5). See also BERNHARD KEMPEN & 
ZAN HE, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON 
PROVISIONAL MEASURES: THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT, available at 
www.zaoerv.de/69_2009/69_2009_4_a_919_930.pdf.  
 76. Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 15–16. 
 77. Id. at ¶ 27. 
 78. Id. at ¶ 32(1)(D). 
 79. Id. at ¶ 32.The court issued the following provisional measures: 
A. The Government of Burkina Faso and the Government of the 
Republic of Mali should each of them ensure that no action of 
any kind is taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute 
submitted to the Chamber or prejudice the right of the other 
Party to compliance with whatever judgment the Chamber may 
render in the case; 
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ing the terms of withdrawal itself, explaining that doing so 
“would require a knowledge of the geographical and strategic 
context of the conflict which the Chamber does not possess, and 
which in all probability it could not obtain without undertaking 
an expert survey.”80 The parties came to an agreement with the 
help of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Accord de non-
agression et d’assistance en matière de défense (ANAD)81 and 
there were no further conflicts before the Court entered its fi-
nal judgment on the merits.82 
2. Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria 
A decade later, the Court built upon the precedent estab-
lished in Frontier Dispute and confirmed the Court’s authority 
to protect human rights in international territory disputes 
through provisional measures.83 The case revolved around a 
                                                                                                             
B. Both Governments should continue to observe the ceasefire in-
stituted by agreement between the two Heads of State on 31 
December 1985; 
C. Both Governments should withdraw their armed forces to such 
positions, or behind such lines, as may, within twenty days of 
the date of the present Order, be determined by an agreement 
between those Governments, it being understood that the terms 
of the troop withdrawal will be laid down by the agreement in 
question and that, failing such agreement, the Chamber will it-
self indicate them by means of an Order; 
D. In regard to the administration of the disputed areas, the situa-
tion which prevailed before the armed actions that gave rise to 
the requests for provisional measures should not be modified. 
Id. 
 80. Id. at ¶ 27. 
 81. The Agreement of Non-aggression and Defense Assistance Agreement 
(ANAD) came into force on November 21, 1983 between members of the West 
African economic community (CEAP) and Togo to promote co-operation and 
peace “in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and the Charter of OAU [Organization of African Unity].” Agreement on Non-
Aggression and Assistance in the Field of Defense, Sept. 6, 1977, 1354 
U.N.T.S. 215. 
 82. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali,), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 10 
(Dec. 22) [hereinafter Burk. Faso/Mali, Judgment]. 
 83. In the Judge Mbaye’s Declaration he responded to this progression by 
stating that, “[t]he Court has consolidated its jurisprudence.” Cameroon v. 
Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, 34 (separate opinion of 
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maritime boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria 
and the issue of territorial sovereignty over the Bakassi Penin-
sula.84 Cameroon brought the dispute before the Court in 1994 
and requested the bench to “specify definitively the frontier be-
tween Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria from 
Lake Chad to the sea.”85 However, on February 3, 1996, while 
the judicial proceedings were in progress, Nigerian troops oc-
cupied the Bakassi Peninsula and violence broke out along the 
Cameroon-Nigeria border.86 Cameroon immediately requested 
an order of provisional measures.87 Due to the gravity of the 
situation, while the Court deliberated, the President of the Se-
curity Council intervened and called upon both parties to re-
spect the ceasefire agreement and to return their troops to the 
positions occupied before the dispute was referred to the 
Court.88 
In determining whether to grant Cameroon’s request for pro-
visional measures, the Court recognized two important limita-
tions: (1) that it cannot “make definitive findings of fact or of 
imputabilily,” and (2) the rights of the Parties “must remain 
unaffected by the Court’s decision.”89 After careful considera-
tion, the Court issued a provisional measure on March 15, 
                                                                                                             
Judge Mbaye). Furthermore, Judge Ranjeva wrote, “The present Order con-
firms – if any confirmation was needed – the jurisprudence of the Chamber in 
the case concerning the Frontier Dispute.” Id. at 29 (separate opinion of 
Judge Ranjeva). 
 84. Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 1. 
 85. Id. ¶ 9. 
 86. Id. ¶ 18. On February 3, 1996, Nigerian troops attacked Cameroonian 
troops resulting in one death, one person missing and several wounded, as 
well as significant property damage. Id. 
 87. Id. ¶ 18 (Mar. 15). Cameroon requested that the Court indicate the 
following provisional measures: 
(1) [T]he armed forces of the Parties shall withdraw to the position 
they were occupying before the Nigerian attack of 3 February 1996; 
(2) the Parties shall abstain from all military activity along the en-
tire boundary until the judgment of the Court takes place; (3) the 
Parties shall abstain from any act or action which might hamper the 
gathering of evidence in the present case. 
Id. ¶ 20. 
 88. Id. ¶ 45. 
 89. Id. ¶ 43. See also Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, Provisional 
Measures Order, 1993 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 44; Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, Provisional 
Measures Order, 2000 I.C.J. Reports 111, ¶ 41. 
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1996, ordering both Parties, inter alia, to “ensure that the 
presence of any armed forces in the Bakassi Peninsula does not 
extend beyond the positions in which they were situated prior 
to [February 3, 1996].”90 The measure was consistent with the 
Security Council’s order that both Parties “take necessary steps 
to return their forces to the positions they occupied before the 
dispute was referred to the International Court [of Justice].”91 
By doing so, the Court remained within the confines of the dual 
limitations it had articulated, listed above, and adhered to 
principles of territorial sovereignty.92 
3. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border 
Area 
The Court took a third approach in ordering provisional troop 
withdrawal from contested territory in Certain Activities Car-
ried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area.93 The dispute arose 
in 2011 after Nicaragua sent armed forces to Costa Rica, with-
out the latter’s consent, for the purpose of protecting Nicaragu-
an workers engaged in the construction of a canal across Costa 
Rican territory.94 Costa Rica claimed that the presence of Nica-
raguan troops violated principles of territorial sovereignty and 
constituted a threat of force in violation of the U.N. Charter.95 
Additionally, Costa Rica alleged that Nicaragua’s dredging op-
eration led to the deforestation of internationally protected 
rainforests.96 Costa Rica brought the case before the Court in 
order to protect its right to territorial sovereignty and to obtain 
reparation for the environmental damage. Pending the outcome 
of the case, Costa Rica also requested provisional measures re-
quiring Nicaragua to withdraw its troops from the disputed ar-
ea immediately and to discontinue its dredging operations.97 
The Court granted Costa Rica’s request for provisional 
measures in part. The Court refused to order provisional 
measures requiring Nicaragua to suspend its dredging opera-
tions because it did not find a risk of irreparable harm to Costa 
                                                                                                             
 90. Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 49. 
 91. Id. ¶ 46. 
 92. Id. ¶ 43. 
 93. Costa Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 86. 
 94. Id. ¶¶ 3, 31. 
 95. Id. ¶ 2. 
 96. Id. ¶ 31. 
 97. Id. ¶ 13.  
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Rica’s environment or to the flow of the Colorado River.98 How-
ever, the Court did order both parties to withdraw troops from 
the “disputed territory” as a means necessary to protect the ci-
vilian population from the threat of force.99 
Costa Rica had a stronger claim to the territorial title over 
the disputed land; however, the Court issued an even-handed 
measure that effectively ordered both parties out of the disput-
ed area.100 Furthermore, each Party retained responsibilities 
for policing the area over which it unquestionably had sover-
eignty.101 In so doing, the Court complied with the fundamental 
limitation on its power to issue interim measures – that it may 
not prejudge a temporary order on the merits of the overall 
case.102 
4. Significance of Prior Orders 
The prior orders discussed above are not binding on the 
Court; however, they are highly influential and have shaped 
the Court’s jurisprudence on provisional measures in the con-
text of territorial disputes.103 The progression of the Orders’ 
reach into human rights considerations demonstrates a broad-
ening of the Court’s authority to issue provisional measures.104 
In the Frontier Case, the Court ordered troop withdrawal to 
protect human rights, which were incidental to those being 
disputed in the main proceeding, effectively overruling the 
                                                                                                             
 98. Costa Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 82. 
 99. Id. ¶ 86. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. ¶ 85. 
 103. Under Article 59 of the Statute of the Court, “The decision of the Court 
has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that partic-
ular case.” Statute of the I.C.J., art. 59, supra note 12; see also Gilbert Guil-
laume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 
JOURNAL INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5, 12 (2011). 
 104. For example, in Cameroon v. Nigeria, the Court observed: 
Where the rights at issue in these proceedings are sovereign rights 
which the Parties claim over territory, and whereas these rights also 
concern persons; and whereas armed actions have regrettably oc-
curred on territory which is the subject of proceedings before the 
Court . . . . The Court possesses by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute 
the power to indicate provisional measures with a view to preventing 
the aggravation or extension of the dispute. 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶¶ 39, 41. 
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PCIJ’s narrow interpretation of Article 41.105 However, this ini-
tial extension of rights was consistent with the principles set 
forth in the U.N. Charter and other humanitarian concerns, 
suggesting that it was an appropriate step in a popular direc-
tion.106 Yet, in a show of important restraint, the Court left it to 
the conflicting parties to determine the terms of the withdraw-
al.107 Whereas in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, the 
Court indicated the general positions for troop withdrawal it-
self, albeit in a manner consistent with the Security Council’s 
recommendation and limited to the territory in dispute.108 
The prior cases broadened the Court’s power to issue provi-
sional measures without overstepping the Court’s jurisdictional 
bounds or infringing upon the territorial sovereignty of the 
Parties.109 These cases demonstrate three different appropriate 
approaches the Court may use to determine troop withdrawal 
positions: (1) mandating that the parties reach a mutual 
agreement,110 (2) ordering parties’ armed forces to return to 
those positions occupied prior to the conflict,111 and (3) ordering 
a mutual withdrawal from the “disputed territory.”112 Although 
these were viable options available to the Court in the Interpre-
tation of Temple of Preah Vihear, the Court opted for a fourth 
approach that was unprecedented and unwarranted.113 
II. ORIGINS OF THE PREAH VIHEAR DISPUTE 
A. 1904 Franco-Siamese Treaty 
The legal dispute over the Temple has its origins in an am-
biguous border delimitation of the Thai-Cambodian border.114 
On February 13, 1904, France (under which Cambodia was a 
protectorate) and Siam (as Thailand was then known) entered 
                                                                                                             
 105. Higgins, supra note 62, at 108. 
 106. ROSENNE, supra note 55, at 4; See generally U.N. Charter. 
 107. Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 32(1)(D). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Costa Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 85; Cameroon v. 
Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 48; Burk. Faso/Mali, 
Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 11. 
 110. Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 27. 
 111. Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 49. 
 112. Costa Rica v. Nicar., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 86. 
 113. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 69. 
 114. Cambodia v. Thai., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 16–17. 
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into a boundary settlement treaty.115 Article 1 of that treaty 
stipulated that the border between Thailand and Cambodia 
was to follow along a watershed in the eastern Dangrek Moun-
tains116 and Article 3 delegated authority to a Franco-Siamese 
Mixed Commission to carry out the exact delimitation of the 
boundary.117 French officers created a definitive boundary in 
1906 and published a map of the frontier (“Annex I Map”), 
which illustrated the entire Preah Vihear promontory, includ-
ing the Temple, to be located in Cambodian territory.118 The 
frontier line in the Annex I Map diverged from the treaty’s 
original watershed provision, which had placed the Temple in 
Thailand’s territory.119 Following the execution of the treaty, 
                                                                                                             
 115. Id. at 16. 
 116. Article 1 of the 1904 Franco-Siamese Treaty provides: 
The frontier between Siam and Cambodia starts, on the left shore of 
the Great Lake, from the mouth of the river Stung Roluos, it follows 
the parallel from that point in an easterly direction until it meets the 
river Prek Kompong Tiam, then, turning northwards, it merges with 
the meridian from that meeting-point as far as the Pnom Dang Rek 
mountain chain. From there it follows the watershed between the 
basins of the Nam Sen and the Mekong on the one hand, and the 
Nam Moun, on the other hand, and joins the Pnom Padang chain the 
crest of which it follows eastwards as far as the Mekong. Upstream 
from that point, the Mekong remains the frontier of the Kingdom of 
Siam, in accordance with Article I of the Treaty of 3 October 1893. 
Id.  
 117. Article 3 of the 1904 Franco-Siamese Treaty provides: 
There shall be a delimitation of the frontiers between the Kingdom 
of Siam and the territories making up French Indo-China. This de-
limitation will be carried out by Mixed Commissions composed of of-
ficers appointed by the two contracting countries. The work will re-
late to the frontier determined by Articles 1 and 2, and the region ly-
ing between the Great Lake and the sea. 
Id. 
 118. The maps were drawn up by French officers at the request of the Sia-
mese Government, due to the limited means of the Siamese Government. The 
French officers completed eleven maps covering a large portion of land be-
tween the countries. Id. at 18, 21. The Commission agreed that the frontier 
line “should ascend the Dangrek from the Cambodian plain by the Pass of 
Kel, which lies westwards of Preah Vihear.” Id. at 17. 
 119. Id. at 15. 
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both countries asserted forms of control over the Temple and 
the issue was not revisited for another fifty years.120 
B. 1962 Judgment 
In 1953, Cambodia attained its independence from France 
and sent guards to the Temple as a symbol of their territorial 
integrity.121 However, Cambodian troops arrived to find that 
Thai forces had reclaimed sovereignty over the Temple.122 Thai-
land and Cambodia attempted to settle the dispute peacefully 
and carried out territorial negotiations in Bangkok.123 Cambo-
dia claimed sovereignty on the basis that Thailand had accept-
ed the Annex I map and was therefore precluded from denying 
its validity.124 Thailand responded with claims that the Annex I 
map was not legally binding on the parties and that “at all ma-
terial times, Thailand has exercised full sovereignty in the area 
of the Temple to the exclusion of Cambodia.”125 The parties 
failed to come to an agreement and Cambodia brought the is-
sue before the Court in 1959 to determine which country had 
rightful ownership to the Temple.126 
In order to make a judgment on the competing claims to the 
Temple, the Court needed to resolve the threshold issue of 
which treaty provision governed the boundary—the watershed 
provision or the Annex I map.127 Basing its decision on the lan-
                                                                                                             
 120. Cambodia v. Thai., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 27. Since the 1904 Treaty, 
Cambodia “performed only a very few routine acts of administration.” Thai-
land showed more evidence of conduct in the area of the Temple, however, 
“the acts concerned were exclusively the acts of local, provincial, authorities” 
in the vicinity of the Temple. Id. at 30. Furthermore, although Thailand came 
into possession of Preah Vihear and certain other parts of Cambodia after 
WWII, Thailand and France entered into a Settlement Agreement whereby 
the States agreed to revert back to the status quo. In order to settle the terms 
of the agreement, France set up a Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission 
consisting of two representatives for each State and three neutral commis-
sioners. During the negotiations Thailand objected to part of the frontier line 
but did not object to the frontier line concerning Preah Vihear and even “filed 
with the Commission a map showing Preah Vihear as lying in Cambodia” in 
1947. Id. at 28. 
 121. Id. at 31. 
 122. Id. at 31. 
 123. Id. at 27. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Cambodia v. Thai., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 11–12. 
 126. Id. at 8. 
 127. Id. at 17. 
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guage of the treaty, the Court determined that the watershed 
provision was merely a guideline on the general character of 
the boundary, whereas the map delineated the boundary’s ex-
act course.128 Accordingly, the frontier would be “the line re-
sulting from the work of delimitation, unless the delimitation 
were shown to be invalid.”129 The Court found that the map 
held official standing and that Thailand had accepted the map 
through its conduct and acquiescence, “conferring on it a bind-
ing character.”130 Therefore, the Court declared the Temple to 
be in the sovereign territory of Cambodia.131 The issue was 
then laid to rest for fifty years.132 
                                                                                                             
 128. In its decision, the Court stated that, 
[i]n general, when two countries establish a frontier between them, 
one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is 
impossible if the line so established can, at any moment, and on the 
basis of a continuously available process, be called in question . . . 
There are boundary treaties which do no more than refer to a water-
shed line . . . The Parties in the present case must have had a reason 
for taking this further step. This could only have been because they 
regarded a watershed indication as insufficient by itself to achieve 
certainty and finality. 
Id. at 34. 
 129. Id. at 34–36. 
 130. The Court held that Thailand could not reasonably assert that it had 
never accepted the map because Thailand “for fifty years, enjoyed such bene-
fits as the Treaty of 1904 conferred on her, if only the benefit of a stable fron-
tier.” Cambodia v. Thai., Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6, 22. Moreover, the Court 
found significance in a visit to the Temple by Prince Damrong, President of 
the Royal Institute of Siam, in 1930. When the Prince arrived at the Temple, 
the French Resident for the Cambodian province greeted him with the 
French flag flying. The Court held that this constituted a “tacit recognition by 
Siam of the sovereignty of Cambodia (under the French protectorate) over 
Preah Vihear.” Id. at 30–31. 
 131. Id. at 34–36. 
 132. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 48. Following the 
decision, Thailand “accepted the decision of the Court, turned over the Tem-
ple to Cambodia, withdrew its troops stationed at the temple, and withdrew 
the Thai tricolor national flag from the disputed area.” The Thai government 
also formally informed the U.N. Acting Secretary-General on July 6, 1962 
that: 
His Majesty’s Government desires to make an express reservation 
regarding whatever rights Thailand has, or may have in the future, 
to recover the Temple of Phra Viharn by having recourse to any ex-
isting or subsequently applicable legal process, and to register a pro-
test against the decision of the International Court of Justice award-
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On July 7, 2008, UNESCO listed the Temple as a World Her-
itage Site due to its “outstanding universal value.”133 One week 
later, Thai forces occupied land adjacent to the Temple – in-
cluded in the UNESCO nomination – claiming territorial rights 
on the basis of the original watershed line in the 1962 Judg-
ment.134 The presence of Thai troops and combat vehicles out-
side the Temple resulted in intermittent armed clashes be-
tween Thai and Cambodian forces.135 On February 4, 2011, af-
ter nearly three years of sporadic armed conflicts, the Security 
Council called for a permanent ceasefire136 and encouraged the 
                                                                                                             
ing the Temple of Phra Viharn [the name given to the Temple by 
Thailand] to Cambodia. 
See Cambodia v. Thai., Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶ 12. However, 
no official claims were made by Thailand in the area of the Temple until 
2008. Id. 
 133. Temple of Preah Vihear, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND 
CULTURAL ORGANIZATION: WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, available at 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1224; Interpretation of Temple of Preah Vihear 
(Cambodia v. Thai.), Provisional Measures Order, at 48. Cambodia’s bid in-
cluded “a disputed map drawn up by French colonial rulers in 1907.” Mydans, 
supra note 4. Thailand stipulated that the inclusion of the Temple shall in no 
way prejudice Thailand’s rights to the dispute and submitted an objection “on 
the basis of incomplete integrity.” Statement by His Excellency Mr. Noppa-
don Pattama, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand and head of the Thai 
delegation to the forty-second session of the World Heritage Committee, (July 
7, 2008) S/2008/474. 
 134. Cambodia v. Thai., 1962 I.C.J. 6. The Democrat Party in Thailand, 
under the leadership of Abhisit Vejjajiva, strongly objected to Cambodia’s 
nomination of the Temple as a World Heritage Site in 2008 out of concern 
that it would negatively affect Thailand’s sovereignty in the area surrounding 
the Temple. This led to the occupation of Thai troops at the Temple and the 
resultant border conflict lasting from 2008–2011. However, the recent elec-
tion of Yingluck Shinawatra for Prime Minister of Thailand is expected to 
mitigate the border conflict and help bring peace to the neighboring coun-
tries. Yingluck Shinawatra was formally elected on July 3, 2011. Supalek 
Ganjanakhundee, Restoration of Relations with Cambodia ‘a priority’, NATION 
(July 5, 2011), http://nationmultimedia.com/2011/07/05/national/Restoration-
of-relations-with-Cambodia-a-priority-30159463.html. Cambodia v. Thai., 
Application Instituting Proceedings, ¶ 14. 
 135. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 48; Mydans, supra 
note 4. 
 136. In a press statement, Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil 
stated, “The members of the Security Council called on the two sides to dis-
play maximum restraint and avoid any action that may aggravate the situa-
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parties to work with the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (“ASEAN”)137 to reach a diplomatic resolution.138 Howev-
er, the powerful political divide between the nations has com-
plicated the process and led to failed negotiations.139 
On April 28, 2011, Cambodia brought the matter before the 
Court and requested an interpretation of the Judgment ren-
dered on June 15, 1962.140 Specifically, Cambodia requested 
clarification on three specific issues: (1) whether the line shown 
on the Annex I map represents a binding boundary between 
the Parties; (2) the meaning and the scope of the phrase “vicini-
ty o[f] Cambodian territory;” and (3) whether Thailand’s obliga-
tion to withdraw armed forces was of a continuing or instanta-
neous character.141 Cambodia additionally requested the im-
mediate withdrawal of all Thai troops as a provisional measure 
pending the Court’s decision on the merits, as discussed in this 
Note’s Introduction. 
                                                                                                             
tion.” Security Council Urges Permanent Ceasefire After Recent Thai-
Cambodia Clashes, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37528&Cr=cambodia&Cr1=
thai&Kw1=Thailand&Kw2=&Kw3=; Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional 
Measures Order, ¶ 48. The ambassador went on to add that the Security 
Council had also “[u]rged the parties to establish a permanent ceasefire and 
to implement it fully and resolve the situation peacefully and through effec-
tive dialogue.” Id. 
 137. ASEAN was established in 1967 pursuant to the ASEAN Declaration. 
The aims and purposes of the Declaration include stimulating economic 
growth and advancing cultural achievements in the region as well as the 
promoting compliance with the U.N. Charter to ensure regional comity and 
stability. Overview, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS, 
http://www.asean.org/about_ASEAN.html. Thailand and Cambodia are both 
Member States of ASEAN. Member Countries, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN NATIONS, www.aseansec.org/74.htm. As ASEAN members, Thailand 
and Cambodia are signatories to the 1976 Treat of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia (TAC), which obliges them to resort to peaceful settlement of 
inter-state disputes. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Feb. 
24, 1976, 1025 U.N.T.S. 316. 
 138. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 48. 
 139. Restoration of Relations with Cambodia ‘a priority’, supra note 134; 
Mydans, supra note 4. See generally Paul Battersby, Border Politics and the 
Broader Politics of Thailand’s International Relations in the 1990s: From 
Communism to Capitalism, 71 PAC. AFF. 473 (Winter 1998–1999), for a 
broader overview of the history of the Thai-Cambodia political conflict. 
 140. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶¶ 1 – 4. 
 141. Id. ¶ 31. 
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On July 18, 2011, the Court granted Cambodia’s request for 
provisional measures after finding that the Court had prima 
facie jurisdiction under Article 60142 and that Cambodia had 
fulfilled the conditions-precedent.143 First, the Court found 
plausible Cambodia’s asserted rights of sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity under the Court’s 1962 Judgment.144 Second, it 
found that a link existed between the provisional measures 
Cambodia had requested and the country’s asserted rights of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.145 Lastly, the Court found 
merit in Cambodia’s claim that recent armed conflicts sur-
rounding the Temple had created an urgent need for judicial 
intervention, notwithstanding the existence of a ceasefire.146 
Based on these findings, the Court granted Cambodia’s request 
and issued the following four provisional measures: 
[1.] Both Parties shall immediately withdraw their military 
personnel currently present in the provisional demilitarized 
zone, as defined in paragraph 62 of the present Order, and re-
frain from any military presence within that zone and from 
any armed activity directed at the zone… [2.] Thailand shall 
not obstruct Cambodia’s free access to the Temple of Preah 
Vihear or Cambodia’s provision of fresh supplies to its non-
military personnel in the Temple… [3.] Both Parties shall 
continue the co-operation which they have entered into within 
ASEAN and, in particular, allow the observers appointed by 
                                                                                                             
 142. Jurisdiction under Article 60 requires that there be a dispute between 
the meaning or scope of a prior judgment. The Court found that the parties 
demonstrated a difference in opinion regarding: (1) the meaning and scope of 
the phrase “vicinity on Cambodian territory;” (2) the nature of the obligation 
imposed on Thailand to withdraw military forces; and (3) the issue of wheth-
er the 1962 Judgment recognized the Annex I map as binding with respect to 
the entire frontier. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 31. 
 143. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 9–12. 
 144. Id. ¶ 39. Thailand asserted that Cambodia’s rights were not plausible 
because “the rights invoked in the request for interpretation must be based 
on the facts examined in the 1962 Judgment and not on facts subsequent to 
that Judgment.” Id. ¶ 36. 
 145. Id. ¶ 45. Thailand argued that the link has not been established be-
cause Cambodia’s request refers to the status of the Annex I map, which can-
not be the subject of interpretation. Id. ¶ 43. Judge Xue also argued that the 
necessary link had not been established in the issuance of the provisional 
demilitarized zone. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures, at 4 (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Xue). 
 146. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures, ¶ 56. 
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that organization to have access to the provisional demilita-
rized zone… [4.] Both Parties shall refrain from any action 
which might aggravate or extend the dispute before the Court 
or make it more difficult to resolve.147 
The second, third, and fourth elements of the Court’s order of 
provisional measures—directing both Parties to cooperate with 
ASEAN and refrain from any action that may aggravate or ex-
tend the dispute—are consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence 
and represent a practical interim solution under the circum-
stances.148 It is the order directing both parties to withdraw 
from a provisional demilitarized zone, which includes the Tem-
ple and additional, undisputed territory that is an unprece-
dented measure exceeding the Court’s jurisdiction.149 
III. A BREAK FROM PRECEDENT 
A. Necessary Expansion to Protect Human Rights 
The importance of provisional measures lies in their ability to 
prevent imminent harm, rather than simply compensate the 
aggrieved parties. International proceedings often take months 
or even years to be resolved and therefore provide an inade-
quate remedy in urgent situations, particularly in the context 
of human rights cases.150 Therefore, provisional measures play 
the crucial role of protecting persons from imminent danger or 
death while at the same time preserving important procedural 
safeguards to ensure justice is achieved through a deliberative 
judgment on the merits.151 
Provisional measures have been granted more frequently in 
recent years to ease international tensions and preserve rights 
to pending disputes.152 Previously, this judicial tool was used 
                                                                                                             
 147. Id. ¶ 19–20. 
 148. Id. ¶ 69(B)(2)–(4). 
 149. Id. ¶ 69(B)(1). Eleven judges were in favor of the provisional demilita-
rized zone and five judges dissented. 
 150. ROSENNE, supra note 55, at 4. 
 151. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, Provisional Measures Order, 
1993 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 46; Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, Provisional Measures Order, 
2000 I.C.J. 111, ¶ 43; Geor. v. Russ., Provisional Measures Order, 2008 I.C.J. 
Reports 353, ¶ 145. 
 152. ROSENNE, supra note 55, at 222. See also Bosn. & Herz v. Serb. & Mon-
tenegro, Provisional Measures Order, 1993 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 52; Burk. Faso/Mali, 
Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 27; Nicar. v. U.S., Provisional 
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with caution and exercised only under the most dire circum-
stances, resulting from the PCIJ’s narrow interpretation of the 
language “as circumstances so require.”153 However, the Court 
has gradually provided a more liberal interpretation of the ur-
gency and gravity required to warrant an order of interim 
measures, particularly in the realm of border disputes.154 This 
trend is not isolated to the International Court of Justice, but 
has been demonstrated by other international bodies as well 
such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee, the U.N. Committee against Torture, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.155 
Provisional measures provide an effective way in which in-
ternational tribunals may prevent human rights atrocities ra-
ther than merely compensate victims after the fact. According-
ly, the Court was within its jurisdictional and institutional ca-
pacity to depart from the PCIJ’s jurisprudence and follow a 
more functional approach that is consistent with its role as the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 
B. PDZ Constitutes Judicial Overreach 
Article 41 of the Statute grants the Court explicit power to 
indicate any measure deemed necessary to protect rights before 
the Court; however, there are innate limitations in that pow-
er.156 These limitations stem from the Court’s jurisdiction and 
jurisprudence discussed in Part I of this Note, as well as from 
widely accepted principles of sovereignty and territorial integ-
                                                                                                             
Measures Order, 1984 I.C.J. 209, ¶ 41; Ger. v. U.S., Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 
466, ¶ 102. 
 153. See Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 12 
(Nov. 21); Nor. v. Den., 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser A/B) No. 48 at 287; Polish Agrarian 
Reform & German Minority (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser A/B) No. 58 
(July 29). 
 154. “The need for the preservation of rights is the legal basis that entitles 
the Court to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute…. 
In the past this provision was interpreted strictly.” Cameroon v. Nigeria, 
1996 I.C.J. 13, 50 (Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola). Judge Ajibola ob-
served in 1996 that “[r]ecent decisions of the Court and its Chambers have 
given a more liberal interpretation to this issue of the preservation of rights.” 
Id. 
 155. Jo M. Pasqualucci, Interim Measures in International Human Rights: 
Evolution and Harmonization, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 4 (2005). 
 156. Statute of the I.C.J., art. 41, supra note 12. 
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rity.157 It was because of these internal and external limita-
tions, despite the absence of express statutory limitations on 
the Court’s authority to issue provisional measures, that five 
judges dissented to the PDZ as exceeding the Court’s jurisdic-
tional bounds.158 Among the dissenting judges was Judge Xue, 
who argued that the measure “puts into question the proper 
exercise of the judicial discretion of the Court in indicating pro-
visional measures, both under the law and by the jurispru-
dence of the Court.”159 
Although troop withdrawal may have been necessary to avoid 
irreparable harm and to protect the rights of local civilians, the 
inclusion of the Temple in the Court’s order raises substantial 
questions concerning the Court’s competence to devise provi-
sional measures and may lead to adverse effects on party com-
pliance.160 The PDZ forces both parties to withdraw troops from 
their own undisputed sovereign territory161 and the measure 
greatly diverges from prior judgments involving territorial dis-
putes without providing legitimate justification for eschewing 
precedent.162 
1. Undisputed Territory 
Judgments by international tribunals involving territorial 
disputes are sensitive and require consideration of many im-
portant factors such as “history, culture, perceptions of ‘right-
                                                                                                             
 157. Id., art. 41(1), supra note 12; CUKWURAH, supra note 9, at 29. 
 158. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 45; Cambodia v. 
Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 4 (dissenting opinion of Judge Xue); 
Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 10 (dissenting opinion of 
President Owada); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 2 (dis-
senting opinion of Judge Donoghue); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional 
Measures Order (dissenting opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh); Cambodia v. 
Thai., Provisional Measures Order (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Cot). 
 159. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 1 (dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Xue). 
 160. PM Wants Parliament to Debate Troop Move, BANGKOK POST (Aug. 18, 
2012), http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/307800/pm-wants-parliament-
to-debate-troop-move; see also Karin Oellers-Frahm, Expanding the Compe-
tence to Issue Provisional Measures—Strengthening the International Judi-
cial Function, 12 GERMAN LAW J. 1279 (2011). 
 161. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 69(1). 
 162. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 1–2 (dissenting 
opinion of Judge Xue); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 9 
(dissenting opinion of President Owada); Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional 
Measures Order, ¶ 4 (dissenting opinion of Judge Donoghue). 
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fulness,’ prior administrative lines, presence in the area of 
tribal and language groups, access to natural resources and re-
spective political power.”163 Consequently, territorial boundary 
disputes are generally resolved through diplomatic negotia-
tions and then legally reflected in treaties, rather than through 
the courts.164 According to one study, courts adjudicated only 
thirty out of 348 territorial disputes between 1919 and 1995.165 
Yet Courts may be gaining more of a role in boundary conflicts, 
evidenced by the large, and growing, portion of cases before the 
International Court of Justice concerning border conflicts.166 
Still, the Court has never before ordered countries to withdraw 
armed forces from their own undisputed territories.167 
Territorial sovereignty is a particularly sensitive issue in 
Southeast Asia where decolonization and shifting empires have 
exacerbated political relations and heightened nationalism con-
cerns.168 These issues and the longstanding conflict along the 
Thai-Cambodian border further support dissenting Judge 
Owada’s view that the Court does not have the power to issue 
provisional measures that “encroach upon the sovereignty of a 
State without its consent, either explicit or implicit, even with 
the best of intentions.”169 
Furthermore, in the July 18 Order, the Court devised a de-
militarized zone using four coordinated points on a flat map 
without sufficient knowledge of the “ground situation in the 
territories.”170 In the Frontier Dispute, the Court refused to de-
fine territorial boundaries without the assistance of expert car-
                                                                                                             
 163. PRESCOTT & TRIGGS, supra note 69, at 138. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. “Approximately one third of the contentious cases before the ICJ have 
dealt with boundary disputes of one kind or another.” Id. 
 167. Judge Xue observed that, “in all the cases that either directly involve 
territorial disputes or bear territorial implications, the Court, in indicating 
provisional measures, has invariably confined such measures to the disputed 
territories and never gone beyond such areas.” Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional 
Measures, at 1 (dissenting opinion of Judge Xue). 
 168. “Cambodia, which has been annexed throughout history by its neigh-
bors on both its eastern and its western borders, is particularly sensitive, and 
its temples are a source of national pride.” Mydans, supra note 4. 
 169. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures, ¶ 11 (dissenting opinion of 
President Owada). 
 170. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 3 (dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Xue). 
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tographers.171 Rather, the Court ordered the parties in that 
case to withdraw their troops to such positions determined by 
an agreement between the parties. This allowed the Court to 
avoid making any arbitrary and impractical determinations on 
troop placement.172 The Frontier Dispute Court demonstrated 
judicial restraint and pragmatism in its refusal to issue a 
judgment that it may be criticized as institutionally incompe-
tent to make. The PDZ devised by the Court in the present 
case, however, does not guarantee cohesion with the land or 
demonstrate judicial restraint. 
2. Lack of Justification for Eschewing Precedent 
Legal justifications and sound reason are important aspects 
of the Court’s role in adjudicating disputes in a fair manner.173 
According to Thomas Franck, even without an overarching 
mechanism to enforce international law, states will neverthe-
less comply if they perceive the law to be fair.174 Fairness, in 
this sense, entails both procedural fairness and perceived sub-
stantive fairness. In the July 18 Order, the Court failed to pro-
vide sufficient reasons for the adoption of the provisional de-
militarized zone under the factual circumstances, especially 
considering the other viable options available.175 This lack of 
justification could be detrimental to the perceived legitimacy of 
the judgment as the parties may fail to comply based on re-
sentment, disagreement, or a sense of illegitimacy.176 
                                                                                                             
 171. Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Order, 1986 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 27. 
 172. Id. ¶ 32(1)(D). 
 173. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures, ¶ 9 (dissenting opinion of 
President Owada). 
 174. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 
(1990). “In the international system, rules usually are not enforced yet they 
are mostly obeyed. Lacking support from a coercive power comparable to that 
which provides backing for the laws of a nation, the rules of the international 
community nevertheless elicit much compliance on the part of sovereign 
states.” Id. 
 175. Judge Xue wrote, “I regret that the Court did not give sufficient rea-
sons for the adoption of the PDZ as one of the provisional measures, particu-
larly upon what considerations such extraordinary measure is warranted.” 
Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, at 2 (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Xue). Judge Owada also criticized the Majority’s Order as “devoid of 
legal justification.” Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 9 (dis-
senting opinion of President Owada). 
 176. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS, supra note 174. 
300 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
Non-compliance with the Court’s provisional measures con-
stitutes a violation of international law under the U.N. Char-
ter.177 However, in practice a State’s unwillingness to comply 
with provisional measures does not have significant ramifica-
tions.178 Most likely, a non-complying state will suffer only rep-
utable harm, for example, “being designated as a rogue state or 
as a State that considers itself above international law.”179 Ac-
cordingly, the benefits of non-compliance often outweigh poten-
tial reputational effects, which has resulted in a lack of uni-
formity in states’ compliance with orders of provisional 
measures.180 
Consequently, the July 18 Order raises concerns that the 
Court’s expanding power to issue provisional measures will 
negatively impact States’ willingness to consent to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. As the Court’s Judge Donoghue observed, 
[T]oday’s Order will not enhance the Court’s scope to contrib-
ute to the peaceful resolution of disputes, but instead will 
chill the appetite of States to consent even in a limited way to 
the Court’s jurisdiction, e.g., in a special agreement, through 
a compromissory clause or through a declaration that con-
tains some limitations. If States cannot be confident that the 
                                                                                                             
 177. Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter provides that “Each Mem-
ber of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the In-
ternational Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.” U.N. Charter, 
art. 94, para. 1. Moreover in Germany v. U.S., the Court confirmed the bind-
ing nature of provisional measures issued under Article 41 by stating that 
the provisional measure “was consequently binding in character and created 
a legal obligation for the United States.” Ger. v. U.S., Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 
466, ¶ 110. 
 178. See generally Joseph Sinde Warioba, Monitoring Compliance with and 
Enforcement of Binding Decisions of International Courts, in 5 MAX PLANCK 
YEARBOOK OF U.N. LAW.(J.A. Frowein and R. Wolfrum eds., 2001) (discussing 
the need for the development of a world mechanism to enforce binding deci-
sions of international courts). 
 179. Pasqualucci, supra note 155, at 46. 
 180. Id. at 4. Nicar. v. U.S., Provisional Measures Order, 1984 I.C.J. 209, ¶ 
41; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
Request for Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Dec. 15); see also Nuclear 
Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Provisional Measures Order, 1973 I.C.J. 135 (June 22) 
[hereinafter N.Z. v. Fr., Provisional Measures Order] (France refused to com-
ply with the Court’s provisional measure and subsequently withdrew from 
the Court’s jurisdiction.) 
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Court will respect the limits of its jurisdiction, they may be 
unwilling to expose themselves to that jurisdiction.181 
Therefore, the July 18 Order may negatively impact the Court’s 
ability to issue authoritative judgments in the future.182 
The Court had alternative courses of action available to it 
when ruling on the provisional measure, provided in prior deci-
sions as well as in the Rules of the Court. Arguably, the Court 
could have achieved its goals of reducing the risk to human 
lives by simply ordering both Parties to abstain from any mili-
tary activities in the disputed territory.183 Furthermore, the 
Court could have also indicated a provisional measure similar 
to that rendered in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, asking the 
Parties, with the co-operation of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), to determine themselves the positions 
to which their armed forces should be withdrawn. Failing such 
agreement, the Court could then, if necessary, draw its own 
lines by means of an Order.184 These alternatives would have 
preserved the Court’s legitimacy and created a similar result to 
that which came from the Court’s unfortunate and overreach-
ing mandate without encroaching on the parties’ territorial 
sovereignty. This in turn, may have resulted in compliance by 
the parties and a full troop withdrawal as ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should strive to apply international norms and 
procedures consistently to achieve harmonization and legitima-
cy. This is especially important due to the jurisdictional pos-
ture of the Court and the need for consent by both parties in 
each particular dispute. Provisional measures have been in-
creasingly prominent in recent years due to their impact in 
protecting civilian populations and preventing any escalation of 
armed conflict during the pendency of border disputes.185 Inter-
                                                                                                             
 181. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 28 (dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Donoghue). 
 182. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 47 (1986) (discuss-
ing state’s general unwillingness to submit matters of national importance to 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.) 
 183. Cambodia v. Thai., Provisional Measures, at 3 (dissenting opinion of 
Judge Xue). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Interim Protection Order, 1973 I.C.J. 
99, at 106 (June 22); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Interim Protection Order, 
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im measures are a necessary tool for international tribunals 
because they offer preventative protection to potential victims 
rather than mere compensatory relief to actual victims.186 The 
value of provisional measures can be further demonstrated by 
the fact that international proceedings can take years to be re-
solved and the rights at stake may be affected before the final 
judgment is determined. 
The beneficial value of these provisional measures, however, 
is contingent upon compliance by the disputants.187 In order to 
ensure party compliance, the Court must adhere to the proce-
dural mechanisms set forth by the Statute of the Court and 
Rules of the Court, as well as established doctrines of interna-
tional law. The July 18 Order constituted an unnecessary over-
reach that undermined the Court’s legitimacy and may ad-
versely impact future consent by U.N. member states.188 Fur-
thermore, underscoring the misguided nature of the Court’s 
decision, the PDZ has proven to be ineffective as neither party 
complied with the terms of the order following the judgment.189 
As of this writing, armed forces continue to occupy the area 
                                                                                                             
1973 I.C.J. 135, at 142 (June 22); Burk. Faso/Mali, Provisional Measures Or-
der, 1986, I.C.J. 3, ¶ 18; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, Provisional 
Measures Order, 1993 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 48; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, 
Provisional Measures Order, ¶ 57; Cameroon v. Nigeria, Provisional 
Measures Order, 1996 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 41; Ger. v. U.S., Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 9, ¶ 
29. 
 186. See Pasqualucci, supra note 155, at 3. The “protective function [of pro-
visional measures] is more important than the compensatory function of a 
final judgment.” Id. 
 187. For example, the United States refused to comply with the Court’s or-
der of provisional measures in the case concerning the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations. The right at issue in the main proceeding, Walter 
LaGrand’s right to life, was irreparably harmed by his execution. Ger. v. U.S., 
Provisional Measures Order, 1999 I.C.J. 9, ¶ 24; Ger. v. U.S., Judgment, 2001 
I.C.J. 466, ¶ 34. 
 188. Judge Koroma observed, “In the absence of such power, the Court’s 
efficacy could be diminished in many cases, since it would run the risk of fac-
ing a fait accompli [a thing accomplished and presumably irreversible] or 
seeing an issue become moot by the time it issues a judgment.” Costa Rica v. 
Nicar., Provisional Measures (Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma). 
 189. “So far, both sides’ troops have not been withdrawn from the PDZ.” 
Cambodia’s Preah Vihear Heritage Site Attracts 49,740 Tourists in 11 
Months, XINHAUENET.COM (Dec. 5, 2011, 7:24 PM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/culture/2011-12/05/c_131289347.htm. 
2012] CAMBODIA V. THAILAND 303 
surrounding the Temple, with virtually no remaining hope for 
the Court to be a part of a resolution to the dispute.190 
Michelle Barnett* 
                                                                                                             
 190. Thailand and Cambodia began to withdraw troops on July 18, 2012, 
exactly one year after the July 18 Order. However, both sides have replaced 
their troops in the area with police and civilian security guards. Therefore, it 
is unclear whether this action can “be deemed as troop withdrawal in accord-
ance with the court order.” Thailand Must Show Maturity in Handling Preah 
Vihear, THE NATION (Aug. 12, 2012, 7:01 AM) 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Thailand-must-show-maturity-in-
handling-Preah-Vihe-30188340.html. 
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